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ABSTRACT 
This thesis describes the need for and development of the Nontechnical Skills for 
Officers of the Deck rating form. The purpose of the NTSOD rating system is to provide 
a framework for evaluating the nontechnical skills of U.S. Navy Surface Warfare Officers 
of the Deck (OOD). Nontechnical skills are the cognitive, social, and personal skills that 
complement technical skills. The NTSOD system supplements the current OOD 
qualification process by providing an objective and documented assessment of the 
nontechnical skills of OOD candidates. The system consists of four categories of 
behavior (leadership, communication, situational awareness, and decision making), which 
are subdivided into 10 more specific, and observable, elements of behavior. The 
framework was developed through the analysis of data collected from qualified OODs. 
When properly utilized, the authors believe that the NTSOD system can improve the 
skills  of OODs, and increase the overall mission effectiveness and safety of the surface 
fleet by providing feedback on a crucial aspect of OOD performance that is not 
consistently evaluated across the Surface Fleet. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Research has shown that greater than 80% of incidents in high-risk organizations result 
from human error. The maritime industry is no exception. It is estimated that 75% to 96% 
of maritime casualties are caused by human error. Although training and feedback are 
provided on the technical skills and knowledge of operators, nontechnical skills are rarely 
addressed. Nontechnical skills are the cognitive, social, and personal resource skills that 
complement technical skills and contribute to safe and efficient task performance. Several 
high-risk industries such as medicine, nuclear power plants, and civilian aviation have 
created behavioral marker systems that provide a mechanism for observing and assessing 
the nontechnical skills of operators. However, there is currently no system available to 
evaluate nontechnical skills of Surface Warfare Officers.  
It is not possible to create a system that is capable of assessing the nontechnical 
skills required for every watch station on a ship. There are simply too many individuals 
with too wide a range of responsibilities. However, as the Officer of the Deck is the most 
important watch station on surface ships, it was the most logical place to begin 
addressing nontechnical skills. 
This thesis describes the development of the Nontechnical Skills for Officers of 
the Deck (NTSOD) rating form. The purpose of the NTSOD rating system is to provide a 
framework for evaluating the nontechnical skills of U.S. Navy Surface Warfare OODs. 
The NTSOD system supplements the current OOD qualification process by providing an 
objective and documented assessment of the nontechnical skills of OOD candidates.  
The NTSOD system consists of four categories of behavior (leadership, 
communication, situational awareness, and decision making), which are subdivided into 
10 more specific, and observable, elements of behavior. The framework was developed 
through the analysis of data collected from qualified OODs. When properly utilized, the 




overall mission effectiveness and safety of the surface fleet by providing feedback on a 
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Human error is a major factor in accidents in the transportation and industrial 
fields. It is estimated to be a causal factor in 80% of mishaps (Reason, 1990). Surface 
warfare is no exception. Therefore, there is a need to develop valid methods for 
addressing human error in the Surface Warfare Officer (SWO) community. These 
methods will raise the overall awareness of SWOs. Once the community is aware of the 
effects of human error, safeguards can be established to limit the incidents. 
B. OVERVIEW 
The Officer of the Deck (OOD) occupies a unique position in a naval ship. 
Nowhere in military or civilian life is there a parallel to the range and 
degree of responsibility that is placed in the hands of the OOD. As direct 
representative of the Captain, he or she acts with all the authority of 
command and, next to the Captain and the Executive Officer (XO), is the 
most important person on the ship. (Stavridis & Girrier, 2007, p. 1) 
As demonstrated by the above quote from the Watch Officer’s Guide, when 
underway, the OOD is the most important watch station onboard United States Naval 
surface vessels. OPNAVINST 3120.32C (2003) established the basic function of the 
watch. “The Officer of the Deck underway has been designated by the Commanding 
Officer (CO) to be in charge of the ship including its safe and proper operation (pp. 4–
18).” 
The current qualification process for OODs primarily consists of the completion 
of the Personnel Qualification Standards (PQS) and an oral board administered by the 
CO, XO, and selected department heads. The PQS for OODs consists of line items that 
qualified OODs verify once the candidate has displayed adequate knowledge of that item. 
These line items primarily concentrate on technical skills and knowledge such as visually 
determining a ship’s target angle and determining compass error using a range. An 
example line item is, ‘Set up a stadimeter and use it to determine the distance to a ship.’ 
Once the candidate has sufficiently displayed the ability to use a stadimeter, a qualified 
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OOD will sign his or her PQS, thereby indicating that he or she is qualified in that 
specific area. The PQS also ensures that OODs have the technical knowledge required to 
respond to emergencies and infrequent tasks (e.g., mooring to a buoy, loss of steering). 
The PQS is the same across the Surface Fleet regardless of the type of ship. Therefore, it 
ensures baseline technical skills and knowledge for all OOD candidates.  
While technical skills and knowledge are important in all high-risk organizations, 
including the military, Admiral Stavridis and Captain Girrier (2007) identified several 
other characteristics that are just as important for a successful OOD. Stavridis and Girrier 
state that forehandedness, vigilance, judgment, intuition, and leadership are traits that are 
just as valuable to OODs as technical knowledge and skills. These traits are examples of 
what psychologists have termed nontechnical skills. 
Nontechnical skills are the “cognitive, social, and personal resource skills that 
complement technical skills, and contribute to safe and efficient task performance” (Flin, 
O’Connor, & Crichton, 2008, p. 1). These skills are not mysterious or new to the surface 
warfare community. Nontechnical skills include skills such as leadership, 
communication, and decision making. The best OODs already possess these skills or 
develop them through experience. Nontechnical skills help watch standers respond to 
situations in an efficient and timely manner. They also help OODs handle situations that 
the current qualification process does not address. 
Through observation, intuition, and experience, CO’s develop an impression of 
the nontechnical skills possessed by individuals under their command. The CO, however, 
rarely has time to observe every watch stander for the time that is required to form an 
accurate assessment of the watch stander’s competence. It is also difficult to translate 
intuition or a ‘gut feeling’ into meaningful data for making a decision as to whether the 
watch stander is competent. Unfortunately, there are no valid and reliable tools available 
to assess, and provide feedback on, the nontechnical skills of the OOD that are crucial for 
safe and effective performance. 
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C. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Technical advancements and increased redundancies in ships and other systems 
have reduced the chances of mechanical errors at sea that would be severe enough to 
cause major incidents. As a result, the majority of groundings, collisions, and other 
maritime accidents are a result of human error. A United States Coast Guard (USCG) 
report identified human error as a contributing factor to 75-96% of maritime casualties 
(Hetherington, Flin, & Mearns, 2006). Assessing and providing training and feedback on 
nontechnical skills could reduce these percentages. Providing COs with a mechanism for 
evaluating non-technical skills would allow them to identify potential shortfalls in the 
skills of OODs and train them more effectively. For example, a deficiency in situational 
awareness or decision making could be addressed and corrected during qualification 
before the individual ever stands a watch. Unfortunately, despite their recognized 
importance, commands do not consistently track or evaluate nontechnical skills for OOD 
candidates. 
D. OBJECTIVES 
There were two primary purposes to this thesis. The first was to identify the 
critical nontechnical skills for the OOD watch station. While Stavridis and Girrier (2007) 
recognized several important nontechnical skills, the traits they identified are difficult to 
observe and assess.  
The second purpose was to develop a valid and reliable framework of non-
technical skills for OODs so that they so that they can be observed and rated.  
E. HUMAN SYSTEMS INTEGRATION (HSI) APPLICABILITY 
HSI emphasizes human considerations as the main priority to reduce life cycle 
cost and optimize system performance. It is a multi-disciplinary field composed of eight 
basic domains: manpower, personnel, training, human factors engineering, system safety, 
health hazards, survivability, and habitability. This thesis focuses on addressing three of 
these domains as applied to the OOD watch station. 
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The first and primary domain addressed is training. Booher (2003) identified 
training as “the requisite knowledge, skills, and abilities needed by the available 
personnel to operate and maintain systems under operational conditions” (p. 3). This 
thesis identifies the nontechnical skills that every OOD should possess. The development 
of a valid and reliable system to evaluate the nontechnical skills of OODs will improve 
the training of OODs. The system will allow COs to identify areas of strength and 
weakness to assist potential OODs during their qualification process. 
The second domain targeted with this thesis is personnel. Personnel is described 
as the “aptitudes, experiences, and other human characteristics necessary to achieve 
optimal system performance” (Booher, 2003, p. 3). This thesis identifies key 
nontechnical skills that can improve the performance of OODs. Since every individual, to 
varying degrees, already possesses these skills, providing a framework for measuring 
them could have impact on the type of person that selected to stand OOD during critical 
evolutions. 
The last domain addressed is system safety. The above quote from Stravridis and 
Girrier demonstrates the immense amount of responsibility that an OOD has while on 
watch. An ineffective OOD possesses the ability to cause severe damage to the ship and 
equipment as well as injury to the ship’s crew. Improving the proficiency of the watch 
standers will increase the overall safety of the ships. 
F. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
This thesis focused exclusively on the nontechnical skills critical for standing 
OOD on U.S. Navy surface warships. The method used to identify the skills is focused on 
critical or stressful moments that occur while standing the watch. However, the system 
applies to the full spectrum of OOD activities.  
While some categories may fit, the findings should not be applied to similar 
watches on other platforms such as submarines or merchant ships without carrying out 
research to assess the validity of the system. The system as a whole also was not designed 
to address other watch stations such as Engineering Officer of the Watch (EOOW) or 
Tactical Watch Officer (TAO).  
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II. EVALUATING NONTECHNICAL SKILLS 
A. MODELS OF HUMAN ERROR 
James Reason (1990) estimated that human error causes 80% of accidents in high-
risk organizations. He identified human error as “a generic term to encompass all those 
occasions in which a planned sequence of mental or physical activities fails to achieve its 
intended outcome, and when these failures cannot be attributed to the intervention of 
some chance agency” (p. 9).  
Based upon research examining failures in high reliability organizations, as well 
as the work of other researcher (e.g., Rasmussen, 1974), Reason (1997) developed an 
organizational model of human error commonly described as the ‘Swiss Cheese’ model. 
This model allows for the identification of active failures and latent conditions in an 
organization. Active failures are unsafe acts that have a direct impact on the safety of the 
system. These acts are normally committed by the system operator (e.g., pilot, 
maintenance personnel, OOD). Latent conditions are the failures or oversights that allow 
or, in some cases, encourage the end user to commit the unsafe act that lead to the 
accident. Latent conditions include issues such as poor design, failures of supervision, 
and shortfalls in training. Latent conditions arise from decisions made by manufacturers, 
designers, and managers. They may be present in the system for many years before any 
mishaps occur (Reason, 1997). Although latent conditions are important contributors to 
accidents and poor performance, the focus of this thesis is on addressing the active 
failures of the Surface Navy, and more specifically the OOD.  
Organizations whose performance may be catastrophically impacted by failures in 
complex human technology systems are known as high-risk industries. High Reliability 
Organizations (HROs) are the sub-set of high-risk organizations that succeed in avoiding 
catastrophes in high-risk environments (Roberts & Rousseau, 1989). The common factor 
underlying HROs is that, while a failure of reliability has the potential for death, loss, 
damage to assets, or ecological disaster, these organizations have developed unique 
properties that enable them to adapt to unexpected events. They develop this ability by 
 6
placing increasing importance on understanding and leveraging the role of the human 
operator (O’Connor & Cohn, 2010). Carter-Trahan (2009) identified U.S. Navy vessels 
as HROs. While the Navy has fewer accidents than would be expected due to the 
complex environment that they operate in, mishaps do still occur. This thesis increases 
the understanding of the human operators, in this case OOD, by identifying the 
nontechnical skills that are important to safe and effective operation. 
Flin, O’Connor, and Crichton (2008) describe non-technical skills as “the 
cognitive, social, and personal resource skills that complement technical skills, and 
contribute to safe and efficient task performance” (p. 1). Situational awareness, 
leadership, teamwork, and decision making are all examples of nontechnical skills. Over 
time, effective operators naturally develop these skills in order to function at high levels 
of performance. While human error cannot be eliminated, improvements in nontechnical 
skills can identify and mitigate potential risks. 
B. BEHAVIORAL MARKER SYSTEMS 
While identifying relevant and applicable nontechnical skills is crucial to safety, 
assessing the skills is also very important. Flin et al. (2008) define assessment as “the 
process of observing, recording, interpreting, and evaluating individual performance, 
usually against a standard defined by a professional body, a company, or a safety 
regulator” (p. 269). The primary technique for assessing or evaluating nontechnical skills 
is through the use behavioral marker systems. 
Klampfer et al. (2001) defined behavioral markers as “observable, nontechnical 
behaviors that contribute to superior or substandard performance within a work 
environment” (p. 10). Behavioral markers derive from data analysis regarding 
performance that contributes to an outcome, either successful or unsuccessful. Behavioral 
markers could be used in any domain, but they are most frequently used in industries in 
which safety is a primary concern. Klampfer et al. (2001) identified five characteristics of 
a good behavioral marker.  
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1. It should describe a specific and observable behavior instead of an 
attitude or personality trait. The operator’s ability to delegate 
responsibilities is observable and a good indicator of leadership skills. 
However, the operator’s attitude towards leadership is not observable, 
so it would not make an effective behavioral marker. 
2. While it does not have to be present in every situation, the behavioral 
marker should have a causal relationship with the performance 
outcome. In other words, the inability for the operator to communicate 
should result in poorer performance for his or her team.  
3. It needs to use domain specific language. A behavioral marker that 
was developed for the maritime shipping industry is unlikely to be 
useful in a nuclear power plant control room due to maritime specific 
language.  
4. It should employ simple phraseology. This attribute will allow the 
marker to be used and understood by a wider range of individuals 
including the assessor and the operator  
5. It should describe a clear concept. 
Organizations can use behavioral markers for multiple purposes. Behavioral 
markers can be used to give feedback on performance to individual operators and teams. 
They can highlight positive and negative examples of performance. The can also provide 
a common terminology for training and debriefing. The most common use for behavioral 
markers is as a tool to measure and evaluate performance (Klampfer et al., 2001). 
Behavioral marker systems are rating tools that consist of multiple behavioral 
markers organized in a manner that allows an assessor to assign grades to each skill. The 
system normally consists of several broad category nontechnical skills (leadership, 
communications, etc.) that are then broken down into smaller elements or markers that 
are observable and relevant. The system should also contain a rating scale that allows for 
consistent assessment across different categories. 
While Klampfer et al. (2001) identified the seven desirable characteristics for a 
behavioral marker, Flin et al. (2008) identified seven properties for an effective 
behavioral marker system as a whole: sensitivity, reliability, validity, structure, 
transparency, usability, and baselines.  
 Sensitivity refers to assessor’s ability to distinguish between good and bad 
performance based upon the markers. If a behavioral marker system 
includes leadership as one of its nontechnical skills, it should be easy to 
identify what markers indicate good leadership and which indicate bad 
leadership. 
 8
 Reliability relates to the stability of the measurement. In other words, the 
same action should be given the same rating in multiple situations. There 
are three primary aspects to reliability: test-retest, internal reliability, and 
inter-rater reliability. Test-retest refers to the stability over time. Raters 
should make the same judgment on the same incident occurring at two 
different times. Internal reliability tests the level of agreement between 
individual markers that are intended to measure the same nontechnical 
skill. For example, three behavioral markers that are being used to 
measure communication skills should show correlated scores. Inter-rater 
reliability is the ability of different raters to give similar actions the same 
score (Flin et al., 2008). 
 Validity is the extent to which a marker actually measures the nontechnical 
skill for which it was designed to assess. Behavioral markers should 
accurately reflect differences in performance. There are two basic aspects 
of validity: face validity and construct validity. Face validity is how 
appropriate the construct looks to the user. In other words, do the markers 
for decision making look like they are actually measuring decision 
making? Construct validity is whether the rating system is actually 
measuring what it claims. In other words, higher scores should actually 
relate to safer and more efficient performance (Flin et al., 2008). 
 Structure refers to how well the components and markers are organized. 
The perfect behavioral marker system would address all possible 
behaviors and there would be no overlap between the categories. 
Unfortunately, it is impossible to create a system that can be used for 
every situation. There always will be some overlap between the categories 
(for example, situational awareness and decision making are intrinsically 
related). The goal, however, is to limit the overlap and increase the total 
coverage as much as possible (Flin et al., 2008). 
 The system should also be transparent or understandable to the operators 
who are being rated. They should have information on the reliability and 
validity of the system, and they should know the criteria against which 
they are graded. 
 The behavioral marker system needs to be usable. The framework should 
be simple and easy to understand. The targeted behaviors should be easy 
to observe, and it should not significantly increase the rater’s workload. 
They system should also have domain-specific language that is familiar to 
both the assessor and operator.  
 Baselines refer to how appropriate the performance criterion is for the 
experience level of the operators. More experienced users should be held 
to a higher standard than trainees or beginners (Flin et al., 2008). 
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Flin et al. (2008) also identified three significant limitations to behavioral marker 
systems. First, they are never capable of capturing every possible aspect of performance. 
The variables that effect performance are simply too wide ranging to rate with one 
system. The second limitation is that there may be limited opportunities to observe some 
behaviors. Important, but infrequent, capabilities such as conflict management or 
intuitive decision making may not occur often enough to rate on a consistent basis. The 
final limitation is the inherent limitations of human observers. While human raters bring 
experience and skills that a fully automatic assessor cannot match, they also bring their 
own biases and perceptions. 
It is important to note that behavioral marker systems need to be domain-specific. 
O’Connor, O’Dea, and Melton, (2007) illustrated that the Human Factors Analysis and 
Classification System (HFACS), which was developed for military aviation, was not 
appropriate for assessing human error or nontechnical skills for U.S. Navy divers. 
O’Connor et al. then tried to apply a behavioral marker system designed for the offshore 
oil industry. Significant changes were made to the taxonomy before it could be 
effectively applied to U.S. Navy diving. 
C. DOMAINS IN WHICH BEHAVIORAL MARKER SYSTEMS HAVE 
BEEN USED 
Behavioral markers are expensive to develop and utilize given the level of 
training required for users. Consequently, they have mainly been developed for 
occupations where safety is prime and simulators are used for training and assessment 
(Flin et al, 2008). The following paragraphs will briefly discuss behavioral marker 
systems that have been developed for civil aviation, medicine, and research that has been 
carried out in the civilian maritime industry.  
1. CIVIL AVIATION 
a. University of Texas Behavioral Markers System 
The first behavioral marker system for pilots was developed as part of the 
University of Texas Human Factors Research Project. The study had two primary 
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purposes. The first was to evaluate the effectiveness of crew resource management 
(CRM) by measuring observable behaviors. The second goal was to aid in the 
development of future CRM programs (Klampfer et al., 2001). 
After the project produced the original set of behavioral markers, the University 
of Texas began collecting systematic data on all aspects of an airline’s operations. The 
markers were incorporated into a system known as the Line/LOS Checklist. As the use of 
the system grew, it became obvious that there were significant differences in crew 
behaviors during flight. The researchers then modified the system to address the markers 
for each phase of flight. The current system is shown in Figure 1 (Klampfer et al., 2001). 
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Figure 1.   University of Texas Behavioral Markers for Airline Pilots (From 
Klampfer et al., 2001) 
b. Nontechnical Skills (NOTECHS) of Pilots 
In 1996, legislation created a need for a generic method of evaluating the 
nontechnical skills of pilots that would be applicable across Europe (Kanki, Helmreich, & 
Anca, 2010). Any method that was developed had to be respectful to cultural and 
corporate differences and usable by airline instructors and examiners. A research team 
consisting of pilots and psychologists from around Europe developed the NOTECHS 
system to assess the CRM skills of individual pilots. 
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The researchers began by examining the behavioral marker systems 
already employed by a number of large European airlines. Each system had problems that 
did not allow the researchers to generalize it for all of European aviation. The systems  
were either too general, too specific, or they assessed the crew as a whole instead of 
individual pilots. As a result, the researchers developed a new taxonomy and rating 
system to assess pilot’s nontechnical skills (Kanki, Helmreich, & Anca, 2010). 
The researchers used an extensive literature review and an examination of 
existing behavioral marker systems. Airline captains with considerable experience in 
using behavioral marker systems then advised on the final design. The result is a 
NOTECHS system that consists of four nontechnical skill categories (cooperation, 
leadership and managerial skills, situational awareness, and decision making) with 
component elements or markers for each. Figure 2 shows the NOTECHS system 
(Klampfer et al., 2001). 
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Figure 2.   The NOTECHS Behavioral Marker System (From Klampfer et al., 2001) 
2. MEDICINE 
a. Nontechnical Skills (ANTS) of Anesthetists 
Fletcher et al., (2004) developed a behavioral marker system for assessing 
the nontechnical skills of anesthesiologists. The performance of anesthesiologists was 
often recorded using video. However, there was no valid and reliable tool to rate the 
nontechnical performance of the anesthesiologists. Fletcher et al. developed the 
Anesthetists’ Nontechnical Skills (ANTS) system to fill that void. 
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Fletcher et al. (2004) started by developing a prototype taxonomy using 
literature review and examinations of existing marker systems. They started with eight 
nontechnical skills: leadership, team working, communication, task management, 
situational assessment, situational awareness, decision making, and personal factors. 
They then conducted 29 interviews using the critical incident technique 
(CIT) method. They were able to derive 116 statements about nontechnical issues from 
the transcripts. Fletcher et al. (2004) then used the interview statements, observations in 
theater, and anesthesia incident reports to trim down the list of nontechnical skills and 
individual elements or markers. The final categories were team management, team 
working, situational awareness, and decision making (see Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3.   Nontechnical Skills and Associated Elements for the ANTS system (From 
Fletcher et al., 2004) 
b. Nontechnical Skills (NOTSS) of Surgeons 
Building on the work carried out by Fletcher et al. (2004), Yule, Flin, 
Paterson-Brown, Maran, and Rowley (2006) identified a training gap for surgeons. 
Analysis of adverse events in surgery revealed that many of the underlying causes were 
not technical failures. Behaviors such as communication were commonly found  to be the 
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cause. While surgeons needed to demonstrate these nontechnical skills, training did not 
address them. Yule et al. (2006) created a behavioral marker system for surgeons entitled 
the Nontechnical Skills for Surgeons (NOTSS) system.  
The researchers interviewed 27 surgeons utilizing the CIT method. They 
asked the surgeons to describe critical incidents in which they were involved. The authors 
used the interviews to identify the key nontechnical skills for surgeons. They were able to 
derive a list of 150 nontechnical skills from the interview transcripts. Yule et al., (2006) 
used the list to develop broad categories and associated elements. A group of consultant 
surgeons then reduced the structure into a taxonomy comprising five categories 
(situational awareness, decision making, communication, and leadership) and 12 




Figure 4.   The NOTSS System (From Flin et al., 2006) 
 17
3. MARITIME SHIPPING 
While no behavioral marker systems have been developed for the maritime 
industry, the Warsash Maritime Center in England has been conducting research into the 
feasibility of applying behavioral markers to the maritime industry (Gatfield, 2005). The 
research has three primary areas of focus. The first is understanding how behavioral 
markers can be used to assess the crisis management capabilities of engineering officers. 
The second is developing a behavioral marker assessment framework. The final focus is 
providing the maritime community with an understanding of how a behavioral marker 
system can be applied to the industry. 
The research is being conducted by observing exercise scenarios within 
simulators. While the research is not yet complete, several behavioral markers have 
already been found that significantly affect the overall performance of engineers in the 
simulators. Figure 5 shows the identified behavioral markers and the associated 
nontechnical skills (Gatfield, 2005). 
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Figure 5.   Behavioral Markers Identified for Merchant Marine Engineering Officers 
(From Gatfield, 2005) 
D. CONCLUSION 
Effective nontechnical skills are crucial for effective performance in high risk 
organizations. Behavioral markers have been shown to be a valid and reliable method for 
providing feedback to operators on nontechnical skills and are being used in a number of 
high-risk domains. Given the prevalence and success of behavioral marker systems, it is 
suggested that they may be an effective method for improving nontechnical skills in the 
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Surface Navy. The next chapter will provide evidence for why behavioral markers will 
benefit performance of Surface Navy personnel. The chapter also will explain why the 
OOD watch station is the first watch for which behavioral markers should be developed. 
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III. THE NEED FOR A BEHAVIORAL MARKER SYSTEM FOR 
OODS 
A. ACTIVE FAILURES IN THE MARITIME INDUSTRY 
Dr. Anita Rothblum (2000) notes that the material conditions of the shipping 
industry have been constantly improving over the last 40 years. Improvements in hull 
design, ship stability, propulsion, and navigational aids all have been implemented to 
reduce casualties and increase efficiency. Unfortunately, despite these advancements, the 
maritime casualty rate is still high. Dr. Rothblum states that this result is due to maritime 
shipping being a people system, so human error is a large contributing factor. She 
estimates that human error causes 75–96% or maritime casualties. Studies have shown 
that human error contributes to 84–88% of tanker accidents, 79% of towing vessel 
groundings, and 89–96% of collisions (Rothblum, 2000). 
Dr. Rothblum also reported the results of a Dutch study of 100 maritime 
casualties. The study found multiple causes for each accident. Of the 100 incidents, 
human error contributed to 96 of them, with 93 events having more than one human 
error. An important finding of the study was the fact that every human error was a 
necessary condition for the accident to occur. In other words, the accidents would not 
have happened if the human errors did not occur (Wagenaar & Groeneweg, 1987).  
In order to illustrate human error in shipping, Dr. Rothblum (2000) breaks down 
two real-life maritime incidents. The first accident is the collision between the motor 
vessel (M/V) SANTA CRUZ II and the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter (USCGC) 
CUYAHOGA that resulted in the death of 11 Coast Guardsmen. The vessels were able to 
see each other visually, and they had radar returns. There were no mechanical 
malfunctions, and no severe environmental conditions. The sole cause of the accident was 
human error (Rothblum, 2000). 
The captain of the CUYAHOGA made the first mistake. He misread the light 
configuration of the SANTA CRUZ II. Therefore, the captain did not have an accurate 
mental picture of the other vessel’s size or heading. As a result, the Captain ordered a 
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turn that took the CUYAHOGA directly across the bow of the other vessel. The second 
fateful error was the failure of the crew to notify the captain of his mistake. They realized 
what was happening, but they were either unwilling or afraid to question the captain’s 
decision. Fatigue and excessive workload may have contributed to the errors committed 
by both the captain and crew because the cutter was undermanned (Rothblum, 2000). 
The second incident that Dr. Rothblum examined was the grounding of the 
TORREY CANYON. This grounding took place in the English Channel in broad 
daylight and calm weather. It resulted in the spillage of 100,000 tons of oil. Four separate 
human errors contributed to the accident. The first two combined to put a large amount of 
pressure on the master of the vessel to make good time. The master believed that if he did 
not make his intended port by the next high tide, he may have to wait up to five days 
before pulling in. He also needed to transfer cargo in order to even the ship’s draft. He 
did not want to perform the task underway because it would increase the chances of oil 
spilling on his decks and he did not want to have the appearance of a messy ship. 
Therefore, the master was in a hurry to pull into port. 
The third human error was the master’s decision to go through the Scilly Islands 
instead of around them in order to save time. Unfortunately, the captain was not familiar 
with the route, and he did not have the correct charts for the area. 
The helmsman made the final mistake. He did not realize that the ship was on 
autopilot, so when he attempted to execute the turning order given by the master, nothing 
happened. By the time the mistake was discovered, it was too late to make the turn, and 
the vessel ran aground (Rothblum, 2000). 
Dr. Rothblum reported the results of a study conducted by the U.S. Coast Guard 
on improving safety and performance through human factors principles. The study found 
that the three largest problems were fatigue, inadequate communication, and inadequate 
technical knowledge (Rothblum, 2000). The author believes that improvements to these 
areas could contribute to the prevention of future maritime casualties  
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David Gatfield (2005) used the story of the M/V GREEN LILY to help justify the 
need for a behavioral marker system to assess the competence of crisis management in 
the engine control room of merchant vessels. The GREEN LILY was underway in 
vicinity of the Shetland Islands in severe weather. At one point, a seawater supply line in 
the engine room broke and caused significant flooding. The engineers gained control of 
the flooding just as the engine stopped. The chief engineer incorrectly assumed that the 
flooding caused the engine to stop. Several unsuccessful attempts were made to restart 
the engine as the vessel slowly drifted towards the island of Bressay. The Shetland 
Coastguard dispatched three tugs, a lifeboat, and a helicopter to assist the vessel. In the 
end, the GREEN LILY ran aground and broke apart. The coastguard managed to rescue 
the entire crew except for one sailor who was swept away and lost at sea (Gatfield, 2005). 
The investigation showed that the engine failure was actually due to the 
mechanical over speed trip. If the engineers would have simply reset the trip, the engine 
would have started and the disaster averted. There was also a lack of situational 
awareness and communication between the crew and the rescuers that further 
complicated the situation. While this situation began with a mechanical failure, human 
error compounded the situation and led to the actual grounding. 
Hetherington, Flin, and Mearns (2006) noted that technical advances in 
navigational aids have reduced the occurrences of mechanical errors severe enough to 
cause significant incidents. However, these advances have revealed the extent to which 
human errors are responsible for collisions, groundings, and other maritime accidents. 
The authors identified three main levels of issues that lead to maritime accidents: design, 
personnel, and organizational. While all three are contributing factors, the personnel 
issues are considered the immediate causes of most incidents. Personnel issues include  
stress, situational awareness, and communication (see Figure 6 for a complete list). The 
authors did identify organizational and management issues as underlying causes to 
mishaps, similar to Reason’s Swiss Cheese model. 
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Figure 6.   An Organizing Framework for Human Factors That Contribute to 
Accidents in Shipping (From Hetherington et al., 2006) 
B. ACTIVE FAILURES IN THE U.S. NAVY 
Although the U.S. Navy collects a large amount of detailed data on the human 
factors causes of aviation mishaps, the same is not true in the surface community. Carter-
Trahan (2009) found that, in an examination of 111 major mishaps in the surface warfare 
community investigated by the Naval Safety Center from 1999 to 2009, only 23% of 
mishaps were attributed to human factors (the remaining were attributed to material 
causes 12%, and unknown causes 65%). A similar finding was reported in an 
examination 263 U.S. Navy diving mishap reports by O’Connor, O’Dea, and Melton 
(2007) where 70% of the mishaps were attributed to “unknown” causes, with only 23% 
attributed to human factors. These percentages are far below the 80% of mishaps that are 
attributed to human error in naval aviation and other high-risk environments. Therefore, it 
is suggested that the information collected on surface mishaps may be an underestimation 
of the extent to which human error contributes to afloat mishaps. The following 




On May 17, 1987, the USS STARK was underway in the Arabian Gulf 
conducting operations to protect Kuwaiti and Saudi oil tankers. That evening, two Exocet 
missiles struck the ship. The first failed to detonate, but the second exploded and resulted 
in the death of 37 sailors. Miller and Shattuck (2004) examined the incident with respect 
to the Dynamic Model of Situated Cognition (DMSC). 
The sensors onboard the STARK were limited due to adverse weather conditions, 
so they relied on the information relayed from an Air Force Airborne Warning and 
Control System (AWACS) aircraft. The Iraqi aircraft that fired the missiles was 
automatically identified as friendly because it was a French-made Mirage fighter. At one 
point, the Iraqi fighter made a sharp turn and increased speed towards the STARK. While 
the watch standers perceived this information, it was not comprehended. As a result, the 
threat was not recognized (Miller & Shattuck, 2004). 
Seven minutes later, the Iraqi aircraft turned directly towards the ship. 
Unfortunately, the crew did not detect this information. By the time the aircraft was 
actually queried, one missile had already been fired, and the other quickly followed. No 
sensor systems tracked the firing, and the first person to realize a missile was enroute was 
the forward lookout. Unfortunately, his information did not reach the combat information 
center (CIC) quickly enough, and the missile impacting the hull was the first that most of 
the ship knew of the attack. Failures in situational awareness and unsafe acts by the crew 
ensured that the ship was not able to respond to the attack. As a result, 37 crewmembers 
lost their lives. 
On July 3, 1988, the USS VINCENNES mistakenly shot down Iranian Flight 655. 
During the time of the incident, the combat information center was extremely busy. The 
ship was tracking two separate groups of Iranian small boats, and CIC was also tracking 
the VINCENNES’ helicopter, which was airborne, and an Iranian military P-3 aircraft 
also in the area. The official investigation reports that the ship was also dealing with a 
fouled gun mount and was maneuvering extensively in an effort to keep the other gun 
unmasked (Miller & Shattuck, 2004). 
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Flight 655 was initially identified as “unidentified assumed hostile.” Shortly after 
take-off, the Identification Designation Supervisor received information that led him to 
believe the contact was actually an F-14 fighter aircraft. Although one officer did 
mention that the contact could be a commercial aircraft, it was officially designated as an 
F-14. 
When Flight 655 was about 12–15 nautical miles away from the VINCENNES, 
the Tactical Information Coordinator mistakenly reported that the contact had started to 
descend. These mistakes were all human errors that ultimately led to the downing of 
Flight 655. The mistakes were caused by increased stress, decreased situational 
awareness, and a preconceived notion of the environment. If one or all of these human 
errors had been avoided, the result of the encounter may have been entirely different 
(Miller & Shattuck, 2004). 
In her thesis, Carter-Trahan (2009) conducted a case study of the USS DWIGHT 
D. EISENHOWER ramming the Spanish Bulk Carrier URDULIZ while the Spanish ship 
was at anchor in the Chesapeake Bay. Multiple human errors contributed to the collision. 
While the radar navigation team was able to obtain fixes on the other vessel, the visual 
navigation team was unable to obtain a fix on the URDULIZ. This lack of cohesion 
between the two teams created a sense of confusion, especially since the visual 
navigation team had primary responsibilities. However, the Navigator and OOD 
continued to make recommendations despite the disconnect in information. These 
recommendations included course and speed changes that were not communicated to the 
CO prior to or after execution. These mistakes, combined with a lack of communication 
from the harbor pilot and the watch standers onboard URDULIZ, caused the 
EISENHOWER to ram the other vessel. 
While data from the Safety Center does not necessarily reflect a high amount of 
human error in Naval incidents, evidence from case studies suggest otherwise. Therefore, 
addressing the nontechnical skills of the SWO community is likely to be effective in 
improving safety and performance. The following section outlines why the initial focus 
should rest on the OOD watch station. 
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C. RATIONALE FOR THE FOCUS ON OOD 
OPNAVINST 3120.32C establishes the basic function, duties, responsibilities, 
and authority of the OOD. The function of the OOD is simply stated: “The OOD 
underway has been designated by the Commanding Officer to be in charge of the ship 
including its safe and proper operations” (pp. 4–18). The instruction then lists the 18 
duties, responsibilities, and authorities that the watch station demands. There is a wide 
variety of actions the OOD must perform. He or she must be aware of the tactical 
situation and geographic factors that may affect safe navigation. The OOD shall make all 
required reports to the CO. He or she must supervise the personnel on watch on the 
bridge and carry out the routine of the ship as published in the plan of the day. The OOD 
needs to supervise transmissions on all radio circuits and conduct on-the-job training for 
the other officers and enlisted personnel on the bridge. This list is just a small sample of 
the immense and varying responsibilities that are inherent to the OOD watch station (for 
the complete list of duties, please refer to OPNAVINST 3120.32C, pages 4–18 through 
4–20). 
The OOD reports directly to the CO for the general operation of the ship and to 
the Executive Officer (XO) for the ship’s routine. There are also certain situations where 
the OOD may report to the Navigator. OPNAVINST 3120.32C identifies 13 separate 
watch stations that report directly to the OOD. Figure 7 shows a simplified version of the 

































Figure 7.   Underway Watch Structure  
(Adapted from OPNAVINSTR 3120.32C page 4–38). 
Admiral Stavridis and Captain Girrier (2007) discuss the importance of the OOD 
watch station. “Nowhere in military or civilian life is there a parallel to the range and 
degree of responsibility that is placed in the hands of the OOD (p. 1).” Stavridis and 
Girrier feel that the duties and responsibilities delineated in OPNAVINST 3120.32C are 
just the beginning. Special missions and circumstances can add more responsibilities, but 
they can never be reduced from what is stated in the instruction. 
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The OOD is accountable to the CO for every event that occurs during his or her 
watch. “As the captain’s direct representative, the OOD is the only person on board who 
can make decisions that affect the safety of the ship and the lives of her crew (Stavridis & 
Girrier, 2007, p. 3).” The CO cannot possibly be on the bridge at all times. In his absence 
the OOD works under his authority and speaks with his or her voice. 
The OOD is the most important watch station onboard U.S. Navy surface ships. 
The responsibilities of the watch are wide ranging, and his or her decisions affect the 
entire crew. Therefore, observing and assessing the nontechnical skills of the OOD may 
improve the overall safety and effectiveness of the ship as a whole. While many different 
watch stations and positions could be analyzed, addressing the nontechnical skills of the 
OOD will go the furthest towards addressing human error in the Surface Navy. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Chapter II illustrated how a number of high-risk organizations have already 
recognized the need to address active failures and nontechnical skills of operators by 
using behavioral marker systems. This chapter focused on establishing the need to 
address failures of nontechnical skills on U.S. Navy surface ships. Unfortunately, it is not 
possible to design a system that will assess the nontechnical skills of an entire ship’s 
crew, nor can one thesis develop a framework of nontechnical skills for every watch 
station. Therefore, in the following chapter a study is carried out to develop a behavioral 
marker system for the OOD.  
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IV. METHOD 
A. INTRODUCTION  
The literature provides three primary methods for identifying nontechnical skills: 
event-based analyses, questioning techniques, and observational techniques (Flin et al., 
2008). Event-based analyses consist of examining accident/near miss reports and/or 
examining information collected for confidential reporting systems. Accident and near-
miss assessments entail analysis of past mishaps that have been recorded by the 
organization. The advantage of this method is that an actual incident has occurred that 
was severe enough to warrant investigation. Therefore, actual examples may be found 
where certain nontechnical skills were lacking and caused the accident. The disadvantage 
of accident analysis is that the reports may be incomplete and only represent part of the 
overall incident (Flin et al., 2008). 
Confidential reporting systems collect information from workers about their 
mistakes or safety concerns that they would not normally be report. When this data are 
successfully fed back to leadership and management, safety improvements can be made. 
Unfortunately, individuals may be reluctant to report their own mistakes or concerns even 
when the system is confidential. However, organizations such as NASA and British 
Airways have successfully used confidential reporting systems to obtain information on 
unsafe events (O’Connor & O’Dea, 2007). 
The second major system for identifying nontechnical skills is questioning 
techniques. This methodology can be divided into interviews, focus groups, and 
questionnaires. There are a three main interview types: structured, semi-structured, and 
unstructured. Interviews are advantageous because the interviewer is able to ask about the 
information that is relevant to him or her instead of hoping that an accident report 
contains pertinent data. The main disadvantage of interview techniques, however, is that 
the interviewee is only going to provide the information that he or she is comfortable 
giving and is able to verbalize. If the person is reluctant to incriminate themselves or 
others, the interview may not provide accurate or relevant information. 
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Focus groups involve a group of people providing feedback on a product or topic 
(Flin et al., 2008). The interaction between group members creates higher levels of 
discussion on specific topics. The advantage is that concentrated amounts of information 
can be gathered, especially on events that are not directly observable. The disadvantage is 
that the moderator or a powerful group member can control the discussion to the point 
that the data are no longer accurate.  
Organizations can use questionnaires to collect specific information on 
nontechnical skills such as leadership, teamwork, and situational awareness. They have 
the advantage of being inexpensive and more efficient when collecting data from large 
groups of people. Unfortunately, there are limitations to the amount and type of 
information that can be collected. 
The third technique that has been used to identify nontechnical skills are 
observations. Researchers can use observations to collect information about the 
workplace settings or a potential problem (Flin et al., 2008). Observations can be divided 
into three types: direct, participant, and remote. The advantage of observation is that the 
researcher is able to witness the information first-hand. Unfortunately, there is no 
guarantee that the desired action will happen, and it is possible that the researcher can 
alter the behaviors of the operators through his or her presence.  
After considering these different methodologies, the author decided to use a 
combination of a literature review, a focus group, and interviews to identify the 
nontechnical skills of OODs. There are multiple reasons for this approach. First, as 
discussed in the previous chapter, the current mishap classification system does not 
adequately capture human error (Carter-Trahan, 2009) and no near-miss, or  confidential 
reporting system exists. Since this thesis focused on the performance of OODs during 
stressful situations, observational methods also were not appropriate. Due to the rarity of 
such events in the surface navy, there is no guarantee that a researcher would have been 
able to observe the desired situation. However, the Naval Postgraduate School contains a 
wealth of knowledgeable and experienced OODs. The author took advantage of the 
presence of these experienced OODs to lead a focus group and interview individuals 
about situations they had encountered in the past while standing the watch as an OOD. 
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There is precedent for this method as the literature review provided multiple examples of 
researchers using subject matter experts to help create and refine their behavioral marker 
systems (Fletcher et al., 2004; Yule et al, 2007). 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Purpose 
The purpose of the literature review was to create an exhaustive list of categories 
of nontechnical skills that have been shown as necessary for effective performance in 
high-risk domains, with a particular focus on any research that had been carried out in the 
maritime industry. A comprehensive review provided a framework to begin production of 
the initial taxonomy of nontechnical skills. Textbooks, articles, and reports about other 
behavioral marker systems established a starting point for identifying the nontechnical 
skills that are applicable to the OOD watch station. 
2. Method 
The author consulted documentation to compile a list of nontechnical skills used 
in other fields. The only reference to behavioral markers in the maritime industry was by 
Gatfield (2005). He used simulator observations to develop a set of markers for assessing 
the competencies of merchant marine engineering officers during crisis management. 
However, the behavioral markers were not developed at the time of publication (nor are 
they discussed in any subsequent publications). Given the dearth of research on 
nontechnical skills in the maritime industry, four behavioral marker systems that were 
available in the literature (LLC, NOTECHS, ANTS, and NOTSS) were examined. Also 
included were the nontechnical skills identified by Stavridis and Girrier (2007), the skills 
discussed by Flin et al. (2008), and the relevant personnel issues identified by 
Hetherington et al (2006). This literature review resulted in the identification of 17 




The literature review created the 17 nontechnical skills shown in Table 1. 
 Situational awareness 
 Decision making 
 Communication 
 Team working 
 Leadership 
 Managing stress 







 Management skills 
 Task management 
 Workload management 
 Assertiveness 
 
Table 1.   Initial List of Nontechnical Skills 
4. Discussion 
The author used the literature review to lay a foundation of nontechnical skills 
that could be considered applicable to the OOD watch station. The list included many 
skills that were overlapping or redundant, but it provided an excellent starting point for 
identifying which of the skills were important to the OOD. 
C. FOCUS GROUP 
1. Purpose 
Several of the nontechnical skills were highly correlated, redundant, or not 
applicable to the OOD watch station. Therefore, the challenge was to identify which of 
the nontechnical skills in Table 1 were appropriate for assessing OODs. Once this had 
been carried out, the goal was for the SMEs to then agree upon an initial taxonomy of 
skills sub-divided into specific elements (the same structure as NOTECHS). 
2. Method 
a. Participants 
The focus group consisted of four U.S.  Navy junior officers led by an 
experienced OOD (the author). Each participant was a Surface Warfare Officer (SWO) 
attending the Naval Postgraduate School. All of the participants had been qualified as an 
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OOD for a minimum of a year. They had all stood the watch numerous times and spent 
time training others to do the same. They were also Human Systems Integration Masters’ 
students, and had attended classes on human factors, safety, individual differences, and 
team working. 
b. Procedure 
The author presented each participant with the comprehensive list of 
nontechnical skills, definitions of each skill, and examples of behavioral marker systems. 
The participants were asked to familiarize themselves with the material prior to meeting. 
The author explained to the participants that the goal was to trim the initial list of skills to 
make it applicable to the OOD watch station. The secondary goal was to identify 
individual elements for each skill. The author encouraged open discussion among the 
participants and answered any questions that arose. 
The group began by eliminating nontechnical skills that they felt were 
either redundant or not applicable. For example, the participants removed judgment 
because they felt it was included under the decision making category. Co-operation was 
eliminated because the focus group felt that is was not applicable since the study was 
addressing individual instead of team skills. The participants removed other skills such as 
forehandedness because the meanings were ambiguous and difficult to rate. 
Once the focus group had identified a list of nontechnical skills, they were 
asked to use these to formulate a taxonomy of categories and associated elements. The 
participants were encouraged to draw from their experience as an OOD to identify 
specific behavioral markers skills. Following the discussion, the group reached a 
consensus on five categories, each with two or three corresponding elements. The 
taxonomy that resulted from the focus group is shown in Table 2. 
3. Results 
The focus group trimmed the list of 17 nontechnical skills down to five: 
leadership, decision making, situational awareness, communications, and stress 
management. The participants also identified two or three elements for each skill. 
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Because this is only the initial taxonomy and alterations are expected, definitions and 
descriptions of the categories will not be provided here. Please see the results section 
following the inter-rater reliability testing for descriptions of the elements in the final 
taxonomy. See Table 2 for the complete initial taxonomy of skills and elements. 
 
Nontechnical Skill Category Elements
Establishing Authority
Managing Workload





Responding to Changes in Information
Anticipating Future Events
Selecting Correct Medium










Table 2.   Initial OOD Nontechnical Skills Taxonomy 
4. Discussion 
The author took advantage of the abundance of experience and knowledge located 
at the Naval Postgraduate School to assist in the identification of the applicable 
nontechnical skills. The focus group took the initial list of skills established from the 
literature review and specifically refined it for the OOD. The participants also identified 
the individual elements that apply to each skill category. This method produced the initial 
OOD nontechnical skills taxonomy shown in Table 2. 
D. CRITICAL INCIDENT INTERVIEWS 
1. Purpose 
While the initial taxonomy appeared to be relevant and applicable to the OOD 
watch station, the author decided to test its validity using real-life examples. The author 
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interviewed qualified OODs regarding their experiences while standing the watch during 
stressful situations. These interviews provided the author with data from real situations. 
This data was used to conduct inter-rater reliability testing to identify potential issues 
with the taxonomy. Section E of this chapter discusses this testing. 
2. Method 
a. Participants 
Eight individuals volunteered to participate in the interview process. Each 
person was a Surface Warfare Officer attending Naval Postgraduate School. Each 
participant had qualified as OOD at a previous command and spent significant time 
standing the watch and training others. Seven of the volunteers had recently completed 
their division officer tours while the remaining individual was on the shore duty 
following his department head tours. 
b. Procedure 
The author interviewed each volunteer separately. Each participant was 
asked to recount a stressful or otherwise memorable series of events that took place while 
he or she was standing OOD. The author encouraged each participant to describe as many 
experiences as they were comfortable providing. The interviews lasted between 25 and 
60 minutes with an average of 45 minutes. The author utilized the Critical Incident 
Technique (CIT) to conduct the interviews. 
 The CIT was first developed and used by Flanagan (1954) to aid in pilot 
selection. However, the CIT technique has been widely used in studies of human error 
and safety (Kirwan & Ainsworth, 1992). The CIT enables the researcher to identify the 
(often tacit) knowledge of skills and expertise possessed by respondents by asking them 
to describe a challenging incident. It goes beyond procedural knowledge by probing the 
behavioral aspects of experience (O’Connor et al, 2008). The CIT interviews were 
conducted in four sweeps, defined below, by a qualified OOD knowledgeable about 
human factors. Each sweep was designed to jog the participant’s memory and get as 
much applicable and accurate information as possible. 
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Sweep 1 - Prompting the interviewee to identify a relevant incident: Each 
participant was asked to select and describe an event that occurred when they were 
standing watch as the OOD which they found to be particularly challenging. They were 
asked to describe the event from their own perspective and to describe it in detail, stage 
by stage, as it developed. 
Sweep 2 - Filling in gaps in the incident: The interviewer repeated the 
reported incident back to the respondent, in order to check understanding. The respondent 
was told they should correct any mistakes in the account or add any information that was 
omitted during the recounting. This sweep helps to pinpoint gaps, both in time and 
events, and typically aids in recall of the missing portions.  
Sweep 3 - Expanding on the incident to look for cues and factors affecting 
teamwork: The interviewer went through the event again, this time probing at various 
points and asking for more detailed description of the nontechnical aspects of the 
situation. This sweep involved questioning the reasoning process and looking for cues 
and rationale for the actions taken by team members. 
Sweep 4 - “What if” queries: The interviewer asks questions about the 
participant’s perceptions, thoughts, judgments, and actions, and what would have 
happened if aspects of the scenario had been different. Each question is designed to 
extract more information that is applicable and gain a better understanding of the story as 
a whole. 
c. Interview Transcription 
The author took extensive notes in addition to obtaining an audio 
recording of each interview. Rather than transcribing the whole interview, the author used 
the notes and recordings to create a single, full report of the experience. The events were 
put into chronological order and repetitions were omitted. The author then edited the 
transcripts into a single format that was concise and comparable across the separate 
interviews. The author then pulled significant events or “statements” from each 
transcript. These statements were primarily actions that the OOD took while standing the 
watch. Each statement would be observable and ratable. 
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3. Results 
Each of the eight participants related between one and three situations from their 
experience for a total of 16 scenarios. After transcribing the interviews, the author was 
able to extract 149 separate and distinct statements from the transcripts concerned with 
the nontechnical skills of the OOD. Exemplar statements are listed below. 
 “The OOD went back to the bridge wing to look at the contact again.” 
 “The OOD reported both contacts to the CO prior to being relieved.” 
 “Once the ship was officially called into its waiting station, the OOD gave 
the order to proceed.” 
 “The OOD never called the oiler to state his intentions.” 
 “Once the ship was only 500 yards off the oiler's bow, the OOD ordered 
the Conning Officer to match the oiler's course and speed to avoid a 
collision.” 
 “The OOD did not use the wind envelope manual to prepare for helicopter 
operations.” 
 “The OOD continued to look at the radar scope instead of looking out the 
windows to see if they were approaching the oiler too fast.” 
 “The OOD did not know that the ship was four miles left of track.” 
 “The OOD ordered the bridge team to stop approaching the other vessel.” 
 “The OOD told the XO that they were not approaching the correct vessel.” 
4. Discussion 
The scenarios provided ample information to evaluate the validity of the 
nontechnical skills taxonomy. The data reflected real-life situations experienced by 
qualified OODs during stressful or trying times. The next section discusses how the 
statements were used to develop a valid and reliable nontechnical skills taxonomy. 
E. INTER-RATER RELIABILITY TESTING 
1. Purpose 
The author tested the inter-rater reliability to ensure that it was possible for two 
raters to reliably use the system to classify the nontechnical skills of OODs.  
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2. Method 
Two individuals worked together to test the inter-rater reliability of the skills 
taxonomy. The first individual was the author who is a Surface Warfare Officer and 
qualified OOD. The second participant was a behavioral psychologist with experience in 
behavioral markers. He has produced similar products for other fields including nuclear 
power plant control rooms and U.S. Navy diving. 
The inter-rater reliability testing consisted of classifying the statements extracted 
from the interviews by their applicable element in the skills taxonomy. The overall goal 
was for both raters to identify each statement by a single element and nontechnical skill. 
If each statement could be sorted into a category cleanly, the taxonomy was effective and 
no revisions were needed. However, if certain statements did not fit anywhere or applied 
to multiple categories, the system needed to be revised. The author calculated the 
effectiveness of the inter-rater reliability using Cohen’s kappa. 
Cohen’s kappa (Cohen, 1960) is a method developed to calculate the inter-rater 
reliability between two individuals. It is considered a better measurement than the simple 
percentage of agreement because it takes chance agreement into account. Cohen’s kappa 
(κ) produces a value < 1.0. The closer that the value is to 1.0, the better that the inter-rater 
reliability is said to be. Landis and Koch (1977) proposed that a kappa of less than 0 was 
indicative of poor agreement, between 0.0 and 0.20 indicates a slight agreement; between 
0.21 and 0.40 a fair agreement; between 0.41 and 0.60 a moderate agreement; between 
0.61 and 0.80 a substantial agreement; and between 0.81 and 1.00 almost perfect 
agreement. The goal of this study was to produce a κ > .81 between the raters. As will be 
shown below, four separate iterations of ratings were required before an acceptable level 
of kappa could be achieved.  
a. Iteration 1 
In the first iteration, the two raters classified 25 randomly selected 
statements using the initial taxonomy (see Table 2). The ratings were conducted 
independently. The first iteration resulted in an inter-rater reliability of κ = .43 indicating 
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moderate agreement. While this was a surprisingly good result for the first run, it was 
clear that changes needed to be made to the taxonomy to improve the inter-rater 
reliability. 
Every nontechnical skill category showed some degree of disagreement, 
especially the individual elements of the leadership and managing stress categories. There 
was also confusion between the decision making, situational awareness, and 
communication skill categories. After discussion of areas of agreement and disagreement 
between the raters, the author made substantial changes to the taxonomy with the aim of 
improving it. Table 3 shows the revised taxonomy. 





Implementing and Reviewing Decisions
Actively Gathering Information
Responding to Changes in Information
Anticipating Future Events
Issuing Orders







Table 3.   OOD Nontechnical Skills Taxonomy Revision 1 
The author eliminated the “managing stress” nontechnical skill category 
and added it as an element under leadership. He also removed the two unclear elements 
from leadership. In an attempt to achieve some clarity between the other categories, the 
author created new elements for decision making and communication while keeping 
situational awareness the same. 
b. Iteration 2 
After revising the taxonomy, the raters tested it again. They classified 25 
different statements using the revised taxonomy (see Table 3), and once again, the ratings 
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were done independently. The second iteration resulted in an inter-rater reliability of κ = 
.65 indicating substantial agreement. The improvement was expected, but it was apparent 
that portions of the system were still unclear and difficult to use. 
The leadership category showed perfect concurrence, and there was good 
agreement on the communication elements. Unfortunately, there was still significant 
disagreement between decision making and situational awareness. The author addressed 
this problem by changing the elements of decision making because they were the least 
clear. Table 4 shows the second revision of the taxonomy. 




Following Orders and Procedures
Intuitive Decision Making
Actively Gathering Information










Table 4.   OOD Nontechnical Skills Taxonomy Revision 2 
The author decided that broader elements would be easier to use and rate 
in the decision making category. It was decided to use the three naturalistic decision 
making styles (analytical, rule-based, and intuitive; Klein, 2008). However, the wording 
of the rule-based decision making was revised to better fit the OOD environment by 
calling it “following orders and procedures.” Because this element had previously been 
classified under communication, the author also had to make minor changes to that 
category. 
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c. Iteration 3 
The raters then took 25 new interview statements and tested the reliability 
of the second revision of the taxonomy shown in Table 4. The third iteration resulted in 
an inter-rater reliability of κ = .70 indicating substantial agreement. While there were 
some minor improvements, a few problems still existed in the taxonomy. 
The leadership and decision making categories showed very good 
agreement. However, there was some confusion between communication and situational 
awareness. Specifically, it was difficult to decide whether the OOD was gathering 
information or receiving information. In the example of a lookout making a report, the 
OOD was certainly receiving information, but he was also improving his situational 
awareness. The author decided that while both elements could apply to the situation, 
gathering information in the situational awareness category covers a wider range of 
events and is more useful. Therefore, the “receiving information” element was eliminated 
from the communication category. The situational awareness elements also were 
reworded to provide further clarification. Table 5 shows the final skills taxonomy. 
d. Iteration 4 
Due to the relatively minor changes made to the taxonomy in the third 
revision, the author decided to rate all 149 interview statements to properly test the latest 
version of the taxonomy. The fourth iteration resulted in an inter-rater reliability of κ = 
.91 indicating nearly perfect agreement. As the level of inter-rater reliability was higher 
than 0.81 (perfect agreement as defined by Landis & Koch, 1977), no further changes 
were made to the taxonomy.  
3. Results 
Table 5 depicts the final taxonomy of nontechnical skills and the 
distribution of the statements across the skills and elements. The inter-rater reliability 
testing created a system with four nontechnical skill categories: leadership, decision 
making, communications, and situational awareness. The following sections discuss each 
category along with the associated elements.  
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Effectively setting and maintaining 
the standards of the watch team. 
The OOD utilized the dead time in the schedule to 






Retaining a calm demeanor when 
under pressure and demonstrating to 
the watch that one is under control. 
Despite the added pressure from the XO, the 






Passing information along to other 
watch stations throughout the ship, as 
well as other assets in the area. 
The OOD called the other ships in formation to 
inform them that the passing oiler was dimly lit 




Effectively giving orders to other 
members of the watch team and other 
individuals as required. 
The OOD ordered the Engineering Officer of the 





Actively gathering information to 
keep up with the changing situation. 
At two nautical miles out, the OOD visually 
inspected the contact through binoculars. 66.1 26.2 
Understanding 
Awareness 
Achieving an understanding of what 
the available information means. 
The OOD identified the contact as a fishing 
vessel by analyzing the lighting configuration. 25.4 10.1 Situational Awareness 
Anticipating 
Future Events 
Forward planning in order to 
anticipate possible future problems. 
The OOD had the Conning Officer drive slightly 
right of the intended track because he knew the 






Generating and comparing multiple 
courses of actions to come up with 
the optimal solution. 
Once the oiler was located, the OOD decided to 
start driving towards her early to ensure that 





Following documented procedures or 
direct orders from superior officers. 
The OOD used the wind envelope guide to make 
sure that the winds were sufficient to conduct 
flight operations. 




Making quick decisions based upon 
prior experience and intuition. 
When the mysterious light finally materialized as 
a sailboat 300 yards off the port bow, the OOD 
immediately ordered “Hard Right Rudder.” 
20.1 
6.7 1.3 
Table 5.   Nontechnical Skills and Elements Percentage Table
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a. Leadership 
The Navy defines leadership as the “sum of those qualities of intellect, of 
human understanding, and of moral character that enable a person to inspire and to 
manage a group of people successfully” (Stavridis & Girrier, 2007, p. 8). The inter-rater 
reliability testing modified the original three elements shown in Table 2 down to the two 
shown in Table 5: managing watch team and managing stress.  
A normal underway watch can be characterized by long stretches of 
monotony followed by periods of fast-paced action. Managing the workload refers to the 
OOD’s ability keep the watch team functioning through the peaks and valleys of activity. 
Life at sea can be a stressful environment for Surface Warfare Officers. 
The responsibilities to his or her division and collateral duties pile up, and fatigue often 
becomes an issue. The ability to block out, or compartmentalize, the stressors and 
concentrate on the watch is crucial to the effective performance of the watch team. For 
this reason, managing stress is a crucial element in the leadership of the OOD. 
b. Decision Making 
Decision making can be defined as “the process of reaching a judgment or 
choosing an option to meet the needs of a given situation” (Flin et al., 2008, p. 41). While 
the focus group developed three broad elements of decision making, the elements did not 
allow for acceptable levels of inter-rater reliability. As a result, three new elements were 
created based on Klein (2008): analytical decision making, following orders and 
procedures, and intuitive decision making.  
Analytical decision making involves the comparisons of multiple courses 
of actions to develop the optimal solution. The OOD encounters many situations that 
require a careful analysis of multiple options. The ability to consistently select the best 
alternative is a valuable skill for an OOD. 
The OOD deals with many situations that are highly structured through 
either documented procedures or direct orders from superior officers. When properly 
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utilized, night orders, checklists, and emergency operating procedures are a few examples 
of the tools that make the OOD’s job much easier. The OODs desire and ability to take 
advantage of these tools is an important element of decision making. 
Intuitive decision making refers to situations where there is insufficient 
time to follow a documented procedure or conduct an analysis of alternatives. These 
instances require the OOD to make quick decisions based upon prior experience and 
intuition. These situations tend to be the most critical and the CO must have confidence 
that the OOD will be able to make the right decision. 
c. Situational Awareness 
Situational awareness is “the perception of the elements in the 
environment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and 
the projection of their status in the near future” (Endsley, 1995, p. 36). As discussed 
earlier, the focus group created three elements for situational awareness based upon the 
levels of Endsley’s (1995) model of situation awareness. These three elements survived 
the inter-rater reliability testing with only minor changes to the wording. The new 
elements are gathering awareness, understanding awareness, and anticipating future 
events.  
The environment around a naval vessel is constantly in flux. The OOD 
must actively gather awareness about his or her surroundings to keep up with the changes 
and adjust accordingly. The OOD has many tools available to help increase situational 
awareness including radars, lookouts, and his or her own eyes. Properly utilizing these 
sensors and tools is crucial to gathering accurate awareness about the surrounding 
environment. 
Simply gathering information is not enough to achieve good situational 
awareness. The OOD needs to use the tools at his or her disposal to achieve an 




Once there is a general understanding of the situation, effective OODs will 
be able to project the information into the future in order to anticipate what is coming 
next. Anticipating future events is crucial to keeping the ship out of dangerous 
environments and situations. 
d. Communication 
Communication is “the exchange of information, feedback or response, 
ideas, and feelings” (Flin et al., 2008, p. 69). The inter-rater reliability testing proved that 
the original elements of communication created by the focus group were largely 
ineffective. The new elements were: providing information and issuing orders. 
The OOD is directly responsible for providing information to the CO and 
XO as well as the navigator in certain situations. He or she must pass information along 
to other assets in the area, as well as to other watch stations throughout the ship. The 
ability to provide the information in a clear and concise manner greatly increases the 
effectiveness of the OOD and the confidence of the chain of command. 
The OOD is directly in charge of a watch team consisting of at least eight 
sailors. The engineering and combat watches also report to the OOD during normal 
operations. These responsibilities necessitate that the OOD issues orders to a wide range 
of individuals in many different situations. Therefore, issuing orders is an important skill 
for the OOD. 
4. Discussion 
Examining the NTSOD skills and elements that were most commonly used to 
categorize the interview statements provides evidence as to the nontechnical skills that 
should be emphasized during OOD training. From Table 5, it can be seen that the most 
frequently used elements were ‘issuing orders’ and ‘gathering information’. These two 




Assertiveness and  giving direct and explicit orders would appear to be an 
important nontechnical skill that should be emphasized in training junior OODs. This 
finding is not unexpected given that the OOD is the leader of the bridge team and must 
provide direction to the 13 different watch stations that report to him or her.  
Gathering information was the most commonly used NTSOD element in this 
study. It was used to classify 26.2% of the interview statements. The failure of U.S.  
Navy sailors to gather information was a key causal factor in the ramming of the Spanish 
freighter by the USS Eisenhower (National Transportation Safety Board, 1990). In 
Endsley’s (1995) three stage model of situational awareness, the first stage of gathering 
information is where most errors occur. Jones and Endsley (1996) examined situational 
awareness errors in civil aviation, while Sneddon, Mearns, and Flin (2006) examined 
them in offshore oil drilling. It was found that the most situational awareness errors 
occurred while gathering information (76.3% and 67.0% respectively), as opposed to 
understanding the meaning of the information (20.3% and 20.0% of errors respectively), 
or anticipating future states (3.4% and 13.0% of errors respectively). Therefore, given the 
importance to the OOD of the skill of gathering information, in combination with it being 
where most errors occur, the OOD must be given training that emphasizes and provides 
practice in effective information gathering (e.g., maintaining a good scan; see Flin et al, 
2008, for more details). 
Intuitive decision making was rarely used to classify the interview statements (it 
was only used to classify 1.3% of the statements). Part of the explanation for this 
surprising finding may be that the operations of a U.S. Navy ship are highly 
proceduralized. However, although it may be rare, the ability to make intuitive decisions 
is crucial for the OOD in risky, fast moving, or non-normal situations for which there is 
no procedure. 
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F. PROTOTYPE BEHAVIORAL MARKER SYSTEM 
1. Purpose 
The final stage in the development of the Nontechnical Skills for Officers of the 
Deck (NTSOD) rating system was to use the categories and elements shown in Table 5 to 
develop a nontechnical skills rating form that could be used by the fleet.  
2. Method 
In order to turn the nontechnical skills taxonomy into a rating form, the author 
studied multiple behavioral marker systems. Each had its strengths, but the format of the 
NOTSS system (Figure 6) showed the most potential for use in the Surface Navy 
environment and had received acceptable usability ratings from surgeons (Yule et al, 
2006). The NOTSS system employs a simple format similar to that used in other 
behavioral marker systems. The header section allows the assessor to personalize each 
form to the individual being assessed and the particular evolution that they are 
performing. Another useful feature of the NOTSS system is the amount of space 
available for taking notes. The notes enabled by this space allow the assessor to provide a 
higher level of feedback to the trainee. 
The NOTSS behavioral marker system was developed for surgeons, so it did need 
to be adapted before it could be used to assess OODs. The author changed the 
information in the header section to apply to standing watch. He included areas to write 
the ship name, trainee and assessor name, and the date. The author also felt that it was 
important to include spaces for the watch (2200–0200, 0200–0700, etc.) and evolutions 
(underway replenishment, normal underway steaming, etc.). 
The author chose to use a four-point (unsatisfactory, marginal, satisfactory, 
outstanding) rating scale. The four-point scale allows for a higher degree of 
discrimination than a two- or three-point scale. The even number also forces the assessor 
to make a judgment about the trainee’s performance. There will be times when not every 
skill is represented during a watch. Therefore, the author did include the choice of not 
observed (N/O). 
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The author created a body similar to the NOTSS system that allows the assessor 
to give scores for both the individual elements and the nontechnical skills as a whole. 
This structure allows the trainee to get feedback regarding the individual skills that need 
improvement, but it also allows the CO or XO to get a quick idea of the performance by 
just looking at the broader categories. The author called the completed behavioral marker 
system the Nontechnical Skills for Officers of the Deck (NTSOD) rating form. Figure 8 
depicts the proposed NTSOD rating form. Detailed instructions on the use of the NTSOD 
system are not provided here, but can be found in Long, O’Connor, & McCauley (2010). 
3. Results 




Figure 8.   Nontechnical Skills for Officers of the Deck (NTSOD) Rating Form 
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4. Discussion 
The prototype Nontechnical Skills for Officers of the Deck (NTSOD) taxonomy, 
shown in Figure 8, provides a format for evaluating the nontechnical skills of OODs that 
was based upon a sound research foundation. However, further developmental work is 
required to ensure that the system can be reliably used by evaluators. Once a prototype 
behavioral marker system has been developed, the next stage is for representative end 
users to rate standardized video enactments of scenarios similar to those encountered in 
the actual environment (Fletcher et al., 2004; Yule et al., 2008). The purpose of this 
evaluation is to assess the sensitivity, inter-rater reliability, and internal reliability of the 
system. The scenarios are typically filmed in a simulator with subject matter experts 
acting the main roles.  
Should an acceptable level of reliability and sensitivity be achieved, the usability 
of the behavioral marker system is then evaluated by evaluating the behaviors of trainees 
in the actual environment (i.e., flight deck, operating theatre, ship’s bridge, etc.). 
Completed rating forms are examined to assess whether all the elements and categories 
are being used and information is obtained from the raters on the usability of the 
behavioral marker system. 
The NTSOD taxonomy not only has implications for the evaluation of the 
nontechnical skills of OODs, but could also be used to provide a research foundation for 
the content of the U.S. Navy’s bridge resource management (BRM) program. As stated 
by Hetherington et al. (2004) “a review of the literature reveals that there appears to be 
no empirical foundation for this type of course beyond research that was originally 
conducted in the formation of aviation [crew resource management] CRM courses” (p. 
407). The U.S. Navy’s BRM program is no exception. Carter-Trahan (2009) carried out a 
study of the attitudes and knowledge of OODs regarding human factors issues that have 
been identified as causal to mishaps in high-risk organization. She stated that there was a 
need for a systematic research effort to identify the particular human factors issues that 
should be included as part of the Navy’s BRM program. 
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The first stage in the development of any training program should be a needs 
assessment. In the context of nontechnical skills training, such as BRM/CRM, a training 
needs assessment is necessary to identify the skills to be trained (Flin et al, 2008). To 
illustrate, extensive background research was carried out to identify the seven skills that 
form the basis of U.S. Naval aviation CRM training (decision making, assertiveness, 
mission analysis, communication, leadership, adaptability/ flexibility, and situational 
awareness; Prince & Salas, 1993). The needs assessment ensured that the training was 
based upon a sound research foundation and that limited time and resources for training 
were being effectively utilized. 
G. CONCLUSION 
To identify the applicable nontechnical skills for OODs, the author used a 
combination of literature review, focus groups, and interviews. Statements extracted from 
the interviews provided the tools that were necessary to test the reliability of the 
taxonomy when applied to actual surface Navy situations. Testing the inter-rater 
agreement multiple times shaped the list of skills into a much more effective and usable 
tool. The next chapter discusses how the author used the nontechnical skills taxonomy to 
create a rating form that could be used to assess the abilities of OODs. 
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V. SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND CONCLUSION 
A. SUMMARY 
This thesis started with the goal of creating a behavioral marker system that could 
be used for assessing the nontechnical skills of OODs. The literature clearly indicates that 
human error is a leading cause a major mishaps, and the lack of nontechnical skills is a 
leading cause of human error. This situation is especially true in high-risk organizations 
such as the Surface Navy. Because it is impossible to create a system capable of 
addressing an entire ship, the OOD was the logical place to begin. 
The author used a combination of literature review, focus groups, interviews, and 
inter-rater reliability testing to identify the nontechnical skills that are applicable to the 
OOD watch station. Once the skills were identified, the author used the taxonomy to 
create the Nontechnical Skills for Officers of the Deck (NTSOD) rating form. The 
NTSOD system can be used to observe and assess the nontechnical skills of OODs and 
candidates trying to complete the qualification. The author believes that with consistent 
use, the NTSOD system can increase the effectiveness and safety of OODs. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
1. Recommendation 1 
Additional research should be conducted to test the NTSOD system’s reliability 
and usability while being used in the fleet or simulators. This research could support the 
findings that the NTSOD system accurately assesses the nontechnical skills of OODs. 
The research could also investigate the effects that the NTSOD system has on the overall 
performance of OODs. 
2. Recommendation 2 
The results of the present study should be used to provide a research foundation to 
Bridge Resource Management (BRM) training so that it more effectively addresses the 
skills required to safely stand the watch.  
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3. Recommendation 3 
While the OOD is the most important watch station onboard surface ships, there 
are many other important positions such as Tactical Action Officer (TAO) and 
Engineering Officer of the Watch (EOOW). Similar watches also exist on submarines 
and merchant marine shipping. The methods described in this thesis should be used to 
develop behavioral marker systems for addressing the nontechnical skills of those watch 
stations as well.  
C. CONCLUSION 
Hetherington et al (2006) stated that there are many gaps in the maritime human 
factors literature. The NTSOD taxonomy is a step towards filling these gaps. Although 
further research is required to establish the reliability and validity of the NTSOD 
taxonomy, it is one of the first research-based behavioral marker systems developed for 
use in a maritime environment.  
Human error can never be eliminated. However, identifying, training, and giving 
feedback on the nontechnical skills that are required for safe and effective performance 
will ensure that sailors have the appropriate skills for minimizing, detecting, and 
mitigating error before it leads to an accident. 
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